Legal incentives for public land grabbing via deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon

Abstract

This paper examines how federal and state land laws in the Brazilian Amazon create incentives that benefit private actors illegally occupying public lands, who subsequently seek legalization through land titling. Throughout this process, they invade public lands, deforest the area to signal occupation, request land titles to governmental agencies, and often lobby to modify land laws in favor of title acquisition. While existing scholarship has focused primarily on federal land policies, this study provides a systematic assessment of land laws in all nine Amazonian states, which are particularly relevant given that between 40 % and 60 % of undesignated public land in the region falls under state jurisdiction. Here, we identify five structural incentives embedded in current land legislation that favor the persistence of public land encroachment: (i) the absence or extension of cut-off dates for the occupation of public lands that can be titled; (ii) the possibility of issuing titles over illegally deforested areas; (iii) the weakness or lack of requirements to restore environmental damage prior to titling; (iv) the pricing mechanisms that substantially undervalues public land; and (v) the limited coordination among land agencies, resulting in an increased risk of titles being issued in areas with other land claims’ priorities according to the law. Our results highlight how current land laws contribute to inefficient allocation of public land, fiscal losses, and continued deforestation. These findings provide empirical support for policy debates in Brazil focused on aligning land laws with environmental protection, climate commitments, and more efficient management of public assets.